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   1	  
Building the Rule of War: Post-Conflict Institutions and the Micro-Dynamics of Conflict 
in Eastern DR Congo 
I. Introduction 
“Kwa kujenga amani, inabidi kujua vita”  
-  To build peace, one must understand war1  -  
In the past decade alone, many seemingly-concluded conflicts have fallen back into 
patterns of cyclical violence and civil war. Renewed fighting has overshadowed reconstruction 
and peacebuilding efforts in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Burundi, East Timor, Iraq and 
South Sudan. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), the provincial capital of 
Goma in the country’s North Kivu province fell under the control of insurgent forces in 
November 2012. The city’s occupation was the fourth in the country’s recent history, and the 
second since a peace accord officially ended the war in 2003. Indeed, countries that 
experienced civil wars in the latter half of the twentieth century were almost twice as likely as 
their counterparts to experience violence, provoking some to declare civil war a chronic 
condition.2 In some of these contexts, hostilities resumed despite billions of dollars in post-
conflict development aid and sometimes years of institution-building by international actors.  
 Why have institution-building efforts supported and promoted by the international 
community so frequently failed to produce robust institutions that can deter and withstand 
resurgent conflict? Extant theory predicts that peace breaks down because wartime adversaries 
cannot credibly commit to lay down arms.3 In theory, at least, stable and impartial institutions 
help overcome commitment problems by reducing uncertainty in inherently uncertain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Congolese axiom. 
2 Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007.  
3 Walter 1997; 2009. 
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environments.4 This logic guides the funding priorities of global donors and policy-makers in 
weak and conflict-prone states. Yet, despite vast sums of money spent worldwide, the 
relationship between warring factions and post-conflict institutions remains strikingly 
underexplored. 
I advance the argument that institution-building projects in fragile states can be limited 
in their ability to contribute to durable peace because, rather than reducing uncertainty as 
intended, they can offer warring factions new venues in which to consolidate military and 
political power. Since the concerns of wartime elites in the post-conflict period often resemble 
the concerns that motivated their behavior during conflict, elites are incentivized to subvert 
post-conflict institutions for strategic or conflict-related ends. Where such incentives persist, 
institution-building programs have the potential to exacerbate rather than stave off conflict-
related insecurity. In this article, I show that post-conflict institutions promoted by 
international stakeholders – for instance, bolstering rule of law infrastructure to prosecute 
perpetrators of wartime violence – present opportunities for armed factions to further their 
political, economic and military agendas behind the scenes while maintaining the outward 
appearance of cooperating with peacebuilding efforts for the benefit of domestic and 
international audiences. Institutions have thus offered new arenas for elites to maximize 
positions of political advantage, thereby eroding rather than fostering conditions of trust.5 
These dynamics shed light on why institution-building projects specifically designed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Hoddie and Hartzell 2010; Weingast 1997. 
5 On related topics, see Englebert and Tull 2008; Paris 2004 for a discussion of the potentially 
destabilizing effects of ill-advised peacebuilding interventions.  
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overcome commitment problems in the aftermath of intractable violence so often prove 
incapable of, or even detrimental to doing so. 
In order to elucidate the complex relationships between conflict-era dynamics, post-
conflict institutions, and prospects for resurgent violence, I present findings from a qualitative 
research project in a single geographical case: eastern DR Congo. The backstage nature of 
much political interaction necessitated an in-depth examination of the micro-dynamics of elite 
behaviour.6 Eastern DR Congo offered a useful site in which to scrutinize these relationships 
since institutional reform has been at the forefront of international efforts to end the conflict.  
In order to examine the role that conflict-era politics played in shaping rule of law 
successes and failures in eastern DR Congo, I undertook a detailed analysis of which rule of 
law programs were successfully implemented and which fell by the wayside. I found that rule 
of law projects were typically stymied when they threatened the conflict-era interests of 
powerful wartime elites, who subsequently withdrew their cooperation. Accountability efforts 
were successful, on the other hand, when they served to advance the strategic military interests 
of elites or when elites could utilize institutional platforms to pursue pre-existing conflict-
related agendas. When wartime elites coopt post-conflict institutions in these ways, their 
capacity to contribute to durable peace may be compromised.  
This research thus demonstrates that international efforts to stave off resurgent violence 
through institutional reform not only tends to overlook local dynamics of conflict as Autesserre 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Walter 2009 calls for closer attention to the microdynamics of institution-building and elite 
calculations. Carson (2015) highlights the "backstage" nature of political action. 
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(2010), Englebert and Tull (2008) and others have observed but, in doing so, can also entrench 
and reproduce conflict-era fissures. To date, policymakers have largely failed to recognize 
these trends, which have a number of important implications for the broader study of peace and 
conflict.  
First, through a micro-analysis of the behavior of wartime elites vis-à-vis post-conflict 
institutions, the article advances the field’s empirical and theoretical knowledge of the complex 
and multidimensional ways in which contemporary civil conflicts are fought. Further, it 
demonstrates important nuance in decisions by elites to honor or subvert peacebuilding efforts. 
With notable recent exceptions,	  7 the literature on civil conflict resurgence has traditionally 
assumed that the key choices facing armed groups in the aftermath of war are cooperation or 
defection. This assumption obscures the multi-layered calculations made by elites and armed 
groups that shape the viability of post-conflict peace. Rather than choosing dichotomously 
between honoring or spoiling negotiations, this analysis reveals that elites often opt for a third 
way, preserving the outward appearance of cooperation with international peacebuilding while 
working behind the scenes to consolidate local fiefdoms and, in some cases, readying 
themselves for an imminent return to war.8  
Second, the research underscores the need to consider intra- as well as inter-group 
dynamics when examining calculations made by armed factions in the aftermath of conflict. 
Rather than treating armed groups as unitary actors engaging in internally consistent decision-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Idler 2015; Keen 2012; Staniland 2012; Themnér 2015. 
8	  Bayart 1993; Berman 1998; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Hoffman 2011; Licklider 2014; Reno 
1999; Utas 2012. 	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making processes, this study emphasizes the need to disaggregate the interests of individual 
decision-makers.9 Civil conflicts are increasingly comprised of myriad stakeholders with 
diverse and often competing preferences, interests and agendas. Sometimes elite interests 
cohere with the interests of the group they are affiliated with but at other times they diverge in 
significant ways.10 Importantly, influential elites are not only concerned with maximizing the 
survival and influence of their unit, but also with maximizing their own personal survival – 
within their armed unit and externally, and under conditions of continued peace or a return to 
war.11 The ways in which threats to personal or intra-group survival structure the strategic 
calculations of decision-making elites in conflict and post-conflict periods colors how we 
approach commitments to peace by respective parties to the conflict.  
Finally, the research warns against taking the apparent successes of post-conflict 
peacebuilding initiatives at face value. While it remains tempting to celebrate incremental 
advances towards peace and justice, scholars and practitioners should be wary of institutional 
reforms that are too readily embraced by warring factions. In scrutinizing the underlying 
dynamics of local power that motivate elites to support specific peacebuilding projects, as well 
as examining why projects are implemented with varying levels of resistance, we become 
better placed to identify exercises in political maneuvering. These factors help us to evaluate 
the potential for post-conflict institutions to contribute to their stated objectives.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012; Christia 2012; Kalyvas 2005; Pearlman and Cunningham 
2012. 	  
10	  See Parkinson (2016) for a powerful discussion of the ways in which intra-group schisms can be 
reproduced.	  
11 Driscoll 2012; Pearlman 2009. 
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The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Part II introduces the theoretical 
framework motivating the research. Part III introduces the case of eastern DR Congo and 
summarizes analysis from 392 incidents of mass violence and their treatment and reception by 
internationally-supported local justice institutions. Part IV presents narrative histories 
illustrating these dynamics from two cases, one in North Kivu and one in South Kivu. Part V 
concludes. 
II. The Post-Conflict Peace  
Resolving civil conflict in the midst of uncertainty 
One of the major obstacles to durable peace in the aftermath of armed conflict involves 
a security dilemma in which the major parties to the conflict cannot credibly ensure that 
opposing sides will honor the agreements they have committed to.12 This commitment problem 
poses a considerable challenge - both to ending civil wars in the first instance and to sustaining 
peace once ceasefires have been reached. This is because, at precisely the time when there are 
no independent or stable institutions to ensure contract enforcement or implementation, 
adversaries are asked to enter into high-risk agreements that require they disarm and 
demobilize.13 Negotiations often fail because parties to the conflict cannot credibly commit to 
abide by the high-risk terms often demanded of them. 
Commitment problems are most pronounced in environments of fragmented authority, 
where no side decisively destroys the combat capacity of any other, or where organizational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Wagner 2000; 1997; 1999; Walter 2009. 
13 Fearon 2004; Mason and Krane 1989; Walter 1997, 1999, 2009.   
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autonomy remains intact after the conflict’s apparent cessation.14 It is in these cases – most 
common in contexts of negotiated settlements or marginal victories – that risks of defection 
remain high and incentives to renege on the terms of the peace remain strongest. 
 Scholars theorize that the specific institutional arrangements of peacekeeping 
agreements,15 combined with third party monitoring,16 can be crucial for reducing incentives to 
return to violence. Firmly institutionalized settlements overcome a variety of distinct security 
concerns: they share power to prevent spoilers from gaining exclusive control of economic 
resources or the coercive apparatus of the new state; they create formal avenues for resolving 
grievances to avoid resorting to violence; and they incentivize actors to comply with new rules 
by institutionalizing sanctions for transgressions. By the same logic, efforts to build the rule of 
law prove critical for transforming the post-conflict landscape from an environment of so-
called anarchy to one of predictable rule-governed behaviour.17 While much of the literature on 
firmly institutionalized civil war settlements focuses on the specific terms of peace agreements, 
investment in the rule of law is equally crucial for strengthening the credibility of any period of 
peace.  
This logic has guided the funding priorities of global donors in many post-conflict 
states. Building a robust rule of law in the aftermath of conflict has been linked to the reduced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Benson and Kugler 1998; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007.  
15 Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Hoddie and Hartzell 2010; Stedman 2002; Walter 1999. 
16 Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Licklider 1995; 
Walter 1997. 
17 Anarchy in this sense refers to the absence of an authority capable of enforcing agreements between 
armed opposition group and the state, rather than a situation of war or state collapse. See: Posen 1993. 
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likelihood of further violence in both academic and policy circles.18 Proponents of legal reform 
emphasize the potential for legal institutions to teach elites and masses that the appropriate 
means of resolving conflict is through formal legal channels rather than through violence. 
Moreover, robust and impartial institutions, firmly grounded in a strong rule of law, reduce 
overall uncertainty in the post-conflict period by institutionalizing sanctions – potentially in the 
form of criminal prosecutions - for non-compliance with established rules.  Given this, peace 
agreements reached in environments where the rule of law is strong, or where legal institutions 
are supported by external stakeholders, should be most effective in bolstering confidence 
among warring parties.19 International donors have thus invested heavily in building legal 
capacity in post-conflict contexts around the world. They train local lawyers, judges and 
prosecutors, strengthen legal infrastructure and support prosecutions against perpetrators of 
conflict violence.  
Given these fairly lofty expectations for institutional reform in post-conflict states, 
close scrutiny of the realities of legal capacity building on the ground is urgently needed. 
Indeed, while the theoretical mechanisms motivating rule of law development are clear, the de 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 HRW 2014; UN 2014; US State Department 2013; Carothers 2006; Tolbert and Solomon 2006; 
Sikkink 2011; Börzel 2012; Fortna 2004; Carothers 2006; Krasner 2004; Krasner and Pascual 2005; 
Ottaway 2002; Risse 2011; Rodrik et al. 2002; Weingast 1997; World Bank 2012. 
19 Flores and Nooruddin (2012) point to the importance of democratic institutions in ensuring 
sustainable peace. Blattman and Miguel (2010); Fearon and Laitin (2003); La Ferrara and Bates (2001); 
and Skaperdas (2008) also highlight the role of institutions in overcoming credible commitment 
problems in protracted civil conflicts. Blattman and Miguel (2010: 12-13) write: “Since formal legal 
and state institutions presumably help to enforce commitments intertemporally, societies with weak 
government institutions and few checks and balances on executive power should empirically be those 
most likely to experience violent civil conflict. This relationship may partially explain the widespread 
occurrence of lengthy civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa, a region notorious for its weak state capacity 
and limited legal infrastructure.” 
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facto interactions between costly institution-building efforts and potential spoilers in volatile 
conflict-prone states remains under-theorized in the literature.  
Understanding elite behavior during and after violence 
In order to understand resurgent violence, scholars must take seriously the fact that 
conflict dynamics can play out across multiple arenas at once and can assume different 
characters at different points in their life cycles. Ongoing conflictual interactions between 
groups and elites off the battlefield, as well as deals, collaborations and negotiations struck in 
political or economic spheres, form part of conflict and post-conflict political orders. These 
relationships are likely to prevail long after groups have formally disarmed.20 Where nascent 
institutions offer new arenas in which to consolidate the destabilizing power of high 
fragmented armed factions, and for disruptive warlords to pursue conflict goals in periods of 
apparent peace, scholars are forced to reconceptualize the spatial and temporal boundaries of 
war. It is well-established that contemporary civil conflicts are increasingly characterized by a 
multitude of predatory or “low-tech” militias operating in environments of extreme state 
weakness or collapse.21 Activities undertaken by armed groups in such settings are far more 
likely to involve military self-protection, the collection of illicit taxes, and other small-scale 
struggles over access to land, resources or personal power, than the singular pursuit of a 
discrete or indivisible policy goal.22 In what have been termed “symmetric non-conventional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2006. 
21 Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Kalyvas 2003, 2005; Raeymaekers 2005; Salehyan 2009; Staniland 2012, 
2014.  
22 See, e.g., Brass 1997; Hazen 2013; Mampilly 2011; Menkhaus 2007; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, and 
Vlassenroot 2008. Kalyvas and Balcells 2010. 
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civil wars”, 23 the state’s monopoly on violence has typically broken down. Multiple armed 
contenders for power coexist with one another, and governments prove either unwilling or 
unable to deploy military force against myriad poorly equipped and disorganized armed 
factions. Individuals may exploit the fragmentation of political authority to assume control 
over local politics or lucrative business opportunities through illicit channels. They may exert 
military force in one realm, and coercion or informal negotiation in others. Rather than a 
assuming a sequential relationship that moves from politics to violence, therefore, violence and 
non-violence often co-exist in tandem as part of the broader landscape of post-conflict political 
order.24 Conflicts may be characterized by indiscriminate shelling at one point in their life 
cycle and by tacit cooperation at others. Moreover, factions may explicitly collaborate to 
smuggle or exchange goods, arms and resources in one sphere, while clashing militarily in 
another. 
The confluence of these dynamics lead us to two broad expectations concerning 
institution-building in areas of pervasive uncertainty. First, elites will pursue strategic 
cooperation across groups, or engage in conflictual or divisive interactions within groups, 
when such behaviour serves to bolster their individual and/or group survival. Decisions 
pertaining to inter- and intra-group relationships of cooperation and conflict will depend on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Balcells 2011; Kalyvas 2005; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010. 
24	  Clausewitz 1969. De Waal (2009) refers to this landscape as a "patrimonial marketplace. He notes 
that post-conflict peacebuilding often assumes an implicit hierarchy in which formal, legal–institutional 
approaches are superior to practices that draw upon locally specific ways of conducting political 
business. See also Chabal and Daloz 1999; Themnér 2011; Utas 2012. 
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level of internal and external threat posed to an elite’s survival, and the relative opportunities 
that arise to advance a particular policy goal or further their position of power.25  
Second, and relatedly, wartime elites will seek to maximize their conflict-era interests 
in the post-conflict period. They will do so with the goal of maintaining a position of personal 
and organizational advantage in the case of continued peace or in a return to war. They will use 
post-conflict institutions as new venues through which to realize these goals, while signalling 
an outward commitment to peace.  
This study examined one particular aspect of post-conflict institution-building deemed 
essential to long-term peace and stability: efforts to build the rule of law through prosecuting 
instigators of human rights abuses and conflict-related violence. This gives rise to one further 
prediction: elites will cooperate with accountability efforts (even against allies, subordinates 
or unit peers), and obstruct justice processes against others (even including apparent wartime 
adversaries), when doing so bolsters their position of individual or organizational advantage. 
Incentives to cooperate arise when accountability efforts facilitate the removal of a potential 
challenger, internally or externally, or when an opportunity emerges to broker a mutually 
productive deal.26 Incentives to thwart accountability might arise when a rival faction can offer 
something valuable in return, when doing so will secure a future military or political ally, when 
an opportunity to repay a personal or organizational debt emerges with the view to future 
potential collaboration, or when elites wish to shield and protect valuable subordinates. Such 
processes fundamentally determine who ends up facing trial for conflict-related violence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Driscoll 2012; Pearlman and Cunningham 2012.	  
26 See also Baaz, Verweijen, and Deslaurier 2013. 
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Furthermore, these backstage interactions explain why some post-conflict peacebuilding efforts 
are met with surprisingly little resistance from local elites, even when cooperation appears 
costly.   
Wartime elites thus support and obstruct investigations in ways that crosscut armed 
group affiliations when it proves politically or militarily expedient for them to do so. Table 1 
depicts two cross-cutting dimensions that explain, in general terms, why elites are likely to 
support post-conflict institution-building efforts in some instances and not in others. First, 
Table 1 presents incentives to advance intra-group interests versus those that advance inter-
group interests. Second, it presents dynamics that pertain to relationships of cooperation within 
and across armed groups versus those that pertain to dynamics of conflict.27 Taken together, 
these two types of relationships elucidate the conditions under which wartime elites can be 
expected to lend their support to post-conflict accountability efforts. Specifically, they explain 
how and why some high profile human rights atrocities have moved seamlessly through the 
Congolese legal system while others have disappeared without trace. The ways in which these 
cross-cutting relationships pertain to institutional reform efforts in eastern DR Congo are 
summarized in Table 3 of the empirical case study. 
Table 1 about here 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 It is important to note that the “group” in this context can refer to armed groups, companies, 
battalions, regiments or informal power networks. Since a number of armed groups in eastern DR 
Congo have been integrated into the national army (the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique 
du Congo (FARDC)) and later defected, many non-state armed groups still function as cohesive units 
under their former commanders following integration. Given the fluidity of these relationships, as well 
as multiple possible chains of command coexisting within the FARDC, the relevant “group” can shift 
from case to case. 
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Table 1: Cross-cutting relationships of conflict and cooperation explaining why elites support or subvert 
institution-building efforts  
 
 Relationships of conflict  Relationships of cooperation  
Intra-group Elites are motivated to support 
accountability efforts against unit peers or 
subordinates when threats to their 
authority arise from within/when doing so 
presents an opportunity to remove an 
internal challenger. 
Elites are motivated to obstruct 
accountability efforts against key 
individuals within their unit when 
opportunities arise to ensure their future 
loyalty in the face of (re)emerging external 
challengers.  
Inter-group Elites are motivated to support 
accountability efforts against adversaries 
when doing so presents opportunities for 
dealing with an external threat, removing 
an external challenger or extracting 
concessions from an otherwise threatened 
third party. 
Elites are motivated to obstruct 
accountability efforts against adversaries 
when doing so can be exchanged for 
political, military or economic payoffs 
from rival factions. Elites are motivated to 
support accountability efforts against 
colleagues or adversaries when doing so 
permits opportunities for productive 
cooperation with a third party. 
 
Since many civil wars are resolved with no clear winners and losers, elites from all 
sides benefit from presenting the appearance of cooperating with the terms of the peace in 
order to maintain a strategic advantage over their adversaries. Furthermore, international 
observers typically promote, implement and oversee institution-building programs and seek to 
incentivize elites to cooperate with them.28 Thus, elite manipulation of legal processes is most 
likely to occur out of sight of third party monitors. Backstage negotiations between groups and 
elites – determining who faces investigation and who does not – are far more likely to shape 
legal accountability efforts than the manipulation of the legal process once a case has moved 
forward to trial. Given that international observers and program implementers promote strict 
fair trial standards, trials may afford due process in the courtroom while elite manipulation at 
the pre-trial stage remains rife. This context gives rise to one final expectation: elites will exert 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  See Donais (2009); Petersen (2001; 2011); and Zaum 2006, on incentives for local elites to cooperate 
with peacebuilding reforms.	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influence over legal processes at the investigative or pre-trial phase, rather than at trial, in 
order to maintain outward appearances of cooperation for the benefit of domestic and 
international audiences. 
While scholars have criticized legal accountability efforts for undermining possibilities 
for political settlement;29 unevenly targeting one particular political or ethnic group;30 reifying 
the violence of the state;31 and failing to deter future violence,32 these critiques have typically 
focused on the promises and pitfalls of trials themselves. Looking only at due process among 
cases that enter the legal system, however, without examining those that fall out in early stages, 
obscures the myriad ways in which post-conflict institutions in sites of pervasive uncertainty 
can be manipulated by elites in pursuit of conflict-related ends. The extent to which the types 
of interference identified herein undermines contributions to the rule of law over the long-term 
remains an open question.  
III. The Congo Wars: Institution-Building in a Case of Pervasive Uncertainty 
 
In this section, I present findings from an in-depth qualitative analysis of efforts to 
build the rule of law through prosecuting perpetrators of wartime violence in eastern DR 
Congo. International assistance has resulted in legal accountability for a surprising number of 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and other grave human rights abuses in recent years. 
These prosecutions have been hailed as major steps forward for peace and reconstruction in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Allen 2006; Branch 2007; Mamdani 2010; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003. 
30 Corey and Joireman 2004; Chakravarty 2006; HRW 2011; Peskin 2005; Reyntjens 2004; Sarkin 
2001; Thomson 2013. 
31 Alexander 2010; Butler 1990; Cover et al. 1992; Comaroff 2001; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; 
Mamdani 2000, 2001; Massoud 2013 
32 Cronin-Furman 2013; Burney, Von Hirsch, and Wikstrom 1999.  
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region.33 However, to date, we know little about why some accountability efforts have been 
successful and others not, or which individuals have faced justice and why.  
The conflict 
Eastern DR Congo represents a case of recurring civil conflict in which no single party 
has secured a decisive victory. While DR Congo is unique with regard to its large number of 
operative armed groups, other features of the conflict are more broadly representative of 
protracted low-intensity armed conflicts. Moreover, as the site of one of the most expensive 
and sustained peacebuilding interventions in history, DR Congo offers a useful case through 
which to analyze why institution-building efforts in fragile states have so often failed to create 
durable and robust institutions. 
Due to the many dimensions of DR Congo’s ongoing conflict, any brief summary will 
fail to fully capture the intricacies of the various micro, meso and macro-level struggles over 
power, political representation, land and resources. Many attribute the ongoing violence to the 
mass displacement that followed Rwanda’s genocide and civil war in the early 1990s. In the 
aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, armed groups backed by Rwandan and Ugandan forces 
led a march on Kinshasa to overthrow President Mobutu Sese Seko. After the Alliance des 
Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) took power in 1996, the 
new president, Laurent Désiré Kabila ordered all Rwandan and Ugandan troops to leave the 
country, angering Kabila’s former Rwandan and Ugandan allies. In 1998, the emergence of the 
Rwandan-backed Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and the Ugandan-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 E.g., Open Society Foundations 2013. 
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backed Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) provided the catalyst for the Second Congo 
War, which involved nine African countries and a host of smaller armed groups.  
The Congo wars officially ended in 2003, but fighting continues to destabilize the 
eastern provinces. The RCD officially became a political party at the war’s conclusion, and 
many former affiliates integrated into the Congolese army. Factions have periodically defected 
to create or join new insurgencies – most notably in the form of the Tutsi-dominated Congrès 
National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) and, later, the Mouvement de 23 mars (M23). 
During their height, both the CNDP and the M23 controlled sizeable territories in North Kivu. 
Periodically, their struggles have involved the mobilization of elite interests along ethnic, 
regional, national or political lines. Yet it would be mistaken to assume that the Congolese 
conflict can be understood solely in terms of the periodic resurrection of RCD elements. 
Dozens of other fragmented and often highly localized armed groups, including various Mai 
Mai self-defence militias and the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) 
control land and resources in the Kivus. Some political and military grievances can be traced to 
specific moments in the country’s history, and others emerged in response to the mobilization 
of elite interests, over issues including citizenship, political power and mining concessions.  
Low intensity conflict was exacerbated by decades of poor governance under former 
head of state Mobuto Sese-Seko and his successors. The popular phrase débrouillez-vous, 
roughly translating as “fend for yourselves,” was used to reference the widespread belief that 
civil servants could use positions of public office to recoup livelihoods lost in unpaid salaries.34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004. See the popularly-quoted Mobutu phrase: “If you want to steal, 
steal a little in a nice way. But if you steal too much to become rich overnight, you'll be caught” 
(Mowoe 1977: 485). 
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This landscape of unrest has been further complicated by period integration and 
defection from the Congolese national army.35 Frequent desertions have led to an environment 
of highly fragmented local control, exacerbated by the fact that the armed forces of today are 
heavily engaged in revenue-generation activities and contain parallel power networks that 
interact with the formal hierarchy. Often, armed groups have been integrated into the FARDC 
in their entirety, increasing the bargaining power of integrated belligerents through the 
plausible threat of defection by an entire group. Informal FARDC command structures have 
thus been likened to DR Congo’s many illicit armed groups, and have been implicated in 
similar types of activities as their non-state counterparts. While the Congolese armed forces as 
a whole does not always appear as a cohesive entity, parallel chains of command can act 
extremely cohesively, often retaining strong political, ethnic or group loyalties.  
The conflict can best be understood, therefore, through geo-political master-cleavages 
overlaid against a collection of micro-level conflicts involving a multitude of discrete 
interests.36 The humanitarian costs of these struggles have been grave. Extreme poverty 
combined with political and economic frustration has led to the looting of civilian populations 
by all groups. Assaults by armed actors have resulted in widespread loss of life, displacement, 
and the frequent destruction of property.  
Since the 2003 peace accord formally ended the war, the international community has 
directed attention and resources towards building institutional capacity to prosecute those 
responsible for acts of violence. Vast sums have been spent to this end. Activities include 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Verweijen 2013; Baaz, Stearns, and Verweijen 2013.	  
36 Kalyvas 2003. See Autesserre (2006, 2010); Lemarchand (2009); Prunier (2009); Stearns (2011) for 
discussions of the micro-dynamics of the Congolese conflict. 
Lake, Milli. 2017. 
“Building the Rule of War” - Forthcoming at International Organization 
Please do not circulate without author’s permission 
	   18	  
building and refurbishing courts and police stations, appointing and assisting investigative 
teams, advising prosecutors, coordinating trials and hearings, constructing and staffing prisons, 
and training and equipping justice sector personnel, among many other activities.37 DR 
Congo’s rule of law programs boast a number of considerable successes. For instance, DR 
Congo became one of the very first countries in the world to utilize the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court to prosecute international crimes through its domestic courts in 
2005.38 Despite the fact that DR Congo’s courts are severely under-resourced, decisions have 
combined elements of the Congolese Penal Code with some of the most up-to-date 
international human rights jurisprudence, to arrive at sophisticated judgements in extremely 
complex areas of international criminal law.39 Moreover, investigations have been pursued 
against members of multiple different parties to the conflict. Convictions have been reached 
against several high-ranking officers in the national army, as well as against notorious 
commanders of powerful local militias.  
Given this record, DR Congo does not easily succumb to the accusations of “victor’s 
justice” that have been levied at other failed accountability efforts.40 On the surface at least, 
legal accountability has crosscut ethnic or group divisions and transcended battleground 
allegiances, giving the impression of relative impartiality. Early criminal convictions were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 International actors heavily involved in rule of law development and criminal justice reform include 
the UN Development Program (UNDP), the UN Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO), 
the American Bar Association (ABA), the European Union, Avocats Sans Frontieres, and many others. 
See Lake 2014b. 
38 It should be noted that the International Criminal Court has also embarked on investigations in a 
select number of Congolese cases in The Hague. See https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc.  
39 Lake 2014a.	  
40 Wherein criminal prosecutions have been used to punish “losers” in a particular conflict. Peskin 
2000; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003. 
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hailed as major stepping stones in the fight against impunity and the quest to build a stable and 
equitable rule of law in DR Congo’s war-torn east.41  
The data 
In an effort to understand whether and in what ways internationally-supported 
accountability efforts disrupt or reinforce local dynamics of power, I analyzed the micro-
processes determining which individuals faced justice for which crimes and why. To this end, I 
compiled a dataset of every incident involving a potential war crime or crime against humanity 
in North and South Kivu reported by NGOs or news outlets between 2005-2012. Drawing from 
three data sources,42 I worked with military prosecutors and other legal experts to document 
which recorded incidents were investigated by DR Congo’s military courts, which proceeded 
to criminal charges and trial, which did not, and why.  
Examining these cases in depth allowed me access to data that a multi-country analysis 
would not have permitted. I worked with legal experts over six weeks of intensive in-country 
fieldwork in May and October 2013. This work built on multiple short visits to the region over 
the preceding five years, as well as nearly a year of in-country fieldwork between 2012 and 
2013. This embedded approach allowed me to build trust among informants and gain access to 
highly sensitive information. Due to the politically delicate nature of the research topic, which 
often required intricate details about conversations that took place behind closed doors 
involving deals struck between powerful wartime elites, it was necessary to gain the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Associated Press 2011; Faul 2011. 
42	  The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED); CrisisWatch; and the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP).	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confidence of a wide variety of interlocutors with insights into Congolese politics, law and 
military operations.  
The material presented in this article draws from approximately 40 targeted interviews 
and over 100 informational interviews. Informants included court officials, prosecutors, 
defense counsel, clerks, insurgents, FARDC officers, security service employees, defendants 
and local politicians. I also gathered data from civil society representatives, human rights 
organizations, witnesses, individuals accused of human rights atrocities, and international in-
country experts. All identifying information has been anonymized. In order to ameliorate 
potential risks to informants, I deliberately employ vague terminology such as “informants 
disclosed” or “some interviewees noted” throughout the text where I summarize sentiments 
expressed by credible interlocutors. I do not cite interview dates or other attributions that could 
be traced back to particular individuals. I do not disclose any confidential details about 
sensitive cases that are not already in the public domain. Case narratives containing non-
confidential details can be found in the online appendix.  
Phase one of the research involved the compilation of a dataset of 392 reported 
incidents of mass violence that occurred in North and South Kivu between 2005 and 2012 that 
could have conceivably been investigated as international crimes.43 I restrict my analysis to 
international crimes rather than ordinary criminal offenses because the international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 International crimes include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression. 
The two international crimes relevant to the Congolese context are war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, defined in the online appendix along with a broad description of the jurisdiction of DR 
Congo’s military courts. 
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community has emphasized accountability for conflict-related violence as a core pillar of 
peacebuilding.  
ACLED, CrisisWatch and UCDP use their monitoring of local and international human 
rights organizations and media sources over extended periods of time to document violent 
events. Their datasets include occupation or expansion into new territory, ordinary criminal 
offences such as car jacking or robbery, and isolated incidents of violence. While it is possible 
that many of these could constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity if perpetrated as part 
of a systematic attack, I restricted my analysis to events that explicitly mentioned specific war 
crimes or crimes against humanity in the media report. For instance, if rape, pillage, looting, 
displacement of persons, forced slavery, abduction, murder of civilians, or any other clearly 
identifiable Rome Statute crime was mentioned in the report, it was included in my analysis. I 
did not include exchange of territory, battleground deaths in which no specific party to the 
conflict was explicitly accused of violating acts prohibited by the Geneva Conventions or the 
Rome Statute of the ICC, protests, or isolated robberies or attacks against individuals by 
unidentified or unaffiliated perpetrators. 
There are undoubtedly shortcomings associated with using conflict events data for such 
a project, given the various challenges associated with reporting human rights violations. I do 
not assume that these data are representative of the universe of war crimes or crimes against 
humanity that occur in the Kivu provinces. On the contrary, they are likely to exclude incidents 
occurring outside of populated areas or those that were slow to reach the attention of NGOs or 
local media outlets. The reasons why these data sources were appropriate for this are addressed 
in the online appendix.  
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After collating each of the events for which data was available and removing repeats 
across the different sources, phase two of the research involved working with legal experts in 
North and South Kivu, including prosecutorial staff, to document which of the 392 incidents 
(230 in North Kivu and 162 in South Kivu) had received attention from justice sector 
institutions. I documented whether each incident of violence was known to the courts and what 
was its current status. During these discussions, the 392 incidents fell into four categories: 
those that had never reached the attention of prosecutors in any form (134); those for which 
there was insufficient information to link a particular perpetrator or perpetrator group to the 
attack (102); those for which investigations were stalled or dropped because the case was 
inaccessible to prosecutors for perceived logistical reasons (77); and those in which 
prosecutors deemed the incident in question to feasibly constitute the basis for a dossier, case 
file or further investigation (79). These four categories were developed through extended 
discussions with in-country legal experts and prosecutorial staff and are discussed in detail in 
the online appendix. Table 2 summarizes the breakdown of these categories in North and South 
Kivu. 
Table 2 about here 
Table 2: Summary of 392 incidents of mass violence examined by military prosecutors 
 
 North Kivu South Kivu Total 
Incident Unknown 103 31 134 
Insufficient Information 52 50 102 
Case Inaccessible 49 28 77 
Investigation Feasible 26 53 79 
Total 230 162 392 
 
From hereon, the article focuses on the 79 incidents in the dataset for which legal 
experts and prosecutorial staff deemed that formal investigations were feasible. Political 
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dynamics undoubtedly influenced cases outside of this sample, including, importantly, cases 
coded as “inaccessible” for which amnesties and other agreements protected individuals from 
investigation. We gain the greatest analytic leverage in understanding the progression of cases 
through the legal system, however, by examining those incidents that military prosecutors did 
not immediately reject as “out of the question”. That is to say, those that could not reasonably 
be dismissed, stalled or discarded for logistical reasons.  
In phase three, I turned to qualitative interviews to map whether the 79 incidents of 
mass violence reported in the dataset were formally registered with the prosecutor’s office. In 
some cases, multiple incidents of violence pertained to the same overarching case. For 
example, multiple attacks were carried out by the FDLR in Bunyakiri over a period of days. 
These appear as separate incidents in the dataset, but pertain to a single overarching 
investigation by courts and NGOs. I thus use the term “case file” “case,” “dossier,” and 
“investigation” interchangeably to refer collectively to a series of related incidents. Of the 79 
incidents, the 26 in North Kivu pertained to 16 separate case files.44 The 53 in South Kivu 
pertained to 20 separate case files.45 Together, these 36 cases comprising of 79 separately 
recorded incidents of violence made up the universe of potential war crimes and crimes against 
humanity investigations that could feasibly have been addressed by DR Congo’s courts. Only 
eight of these resulted in trial in the timeframe of the study.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Including seven formal international crimes dossiers on the Registre de Ministre Public (RMP) and a 
single war crimes/crimes against humanity trial in the time frame of study.  
45 Including 20 formal dossiers open at the RMP, seven of which resulted in human rights trials in the 
timeframe of study. 
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For each of the 36 case files, I mapped whether, when and against whom warrants were 
issued and arrests made, whether dossiers were opened and transferred from the prosecutor’s 
office to the court, and whether a trial ever took place. To assess the influence of conflict-era 
politics over institutional responses to mass violence, I interviewed a wide range of individuals 
with knowledge of each case. These included prosecutors, NGOs, and, where possible and 
relevant, unit commanders, intelligence officers, military police, civil society representatives or 
UN personnel. The interviews, designed to solicit information about the various factors that 
influenced whether or not cases moved forward, unveiled which groups and individuals were 
implicated in the incident in question, who was arrested or charged, who issued and executed 
warrants, who was implicated in the incident but not arrested (and why), how quickly 
developments were processed by the courts, and whether certain allegations, charges or 
warrants were dropped or abandoned.  
Once the interviews were complete, phase four involved coding and analysis in 
multiple stages. Information about each dossier was examined with particular attention to the 
factors that facilitated the progression of a case to trial and the factors that obstructed 
investigation and prosecution. I documented the ways in which military elites of different 
armed group affiliations behaved towards reports of mass violence and how this behaviour 
shaped institutional processes. I used these data to compile complete narrative histories of each 
incident, paying close attention to contradictory accounts and the credibility of different 
sources. I drew from my prior experience working with the Congolese justice system, as well 
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as the opinions of trusted local sources, to triangulate across testimonies and assess the validity 
and reliability of each claim.46 
Coding and Analysis 
Analyzing each case narrative in turn, I identified any statement pertaining to my 
outcome of interest: the progression of that case towards trial. Statements of interests included 
any reference to the formal registration of a case with the Auditorat Militaire, the issuance of a 
warrant or mandate d’amener, investigations or witness interviews, site visits, arrests, the 
transfer of a case to the Cour Militaire, and, finally, the scheduling and occurrence of a trial. I 
then assessed each case history against the overarching expectations outlined in the previous 
section in order to evaluate the conditions under which wartime elites across factions 
cooperated with or obstructed efforts to ensure legal accountability for wartime violence.  
Four types of interactions pertaining to elite behavior emerged from this analysis, 
determining whether and how a case ended up in court. I refer to these four categories of 
interactions as distinct mechanisms that produced an outcome of interest.47 These four 
mechanisms do not necessarily reveal an exhaustive typology and nor are they mutually 
exclusive. Indeed, multiple mechanisms were often at work in a single case file, especially 
given that elites might support investigations against certain individuals while obstructing 
investigations against others implicated in the same case. Together, the mechanisms serve to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See Fuji 2010. Also Rubin and Rubin 2012; Schatz 2009; Soss 2006; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 
2006 on interpreting interviewee testimony. 
47 I follow McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001: 25); Hedström and Swedberg (1998: 7) and Hedström 
and Ylikoski (2010) in defining a mechanism as the aspect of a causal process that produces the effect 
of interest. In this case, the outcome was the progression of a case through the legal system. 
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illustrate the ways in which conflict-era elites support or obstruct accountability or other 
institution-building efforts in the service of their own conflict-related agendas. 
Two clear mechanisms determined why cases moved forward through the justice 
system: removing challengers or adversaries and deflecting attention from acts of violence. 
One mechanism determined why cases were discarded: protecting loyalties; and one 
mechanism: brokering deals, could either propel or obstruct cases. Two of these mechanisms – 
deflecting attention and protecting loyalties – pertained exclusively to intra-group dynamics. 
Deflecting attention most commonly represented relationships of intra-group conflict whereby 
one influential elite or coalition of elites facilitated an investigation against a subordinate 
within their ranks in a bid to escape investigation themselves. Protecting loyalties most 
commonly represented relationships of intra-group cooperation, as unit commanders or former 
unit commanders sought to obstruct cases against subordinates or allies. The remaining 
mechanisms, removing potential challengers and brokering deals, pertained to both inter- and 
intra-group dynamics. Importantly, some of these interactions were born out of relationships of 
cooperation, as actors forged allegiances or struck mutually beneficial deals with one another, 
while others engendered relationships of conflict as elites sought to scapegoat subordinates or 
target adversaries.  
The four mechanisms, which pervaded the majority of case files and are described in 
detail below, can be understood conceptually – and can generalize to post-conflict institutions 
more broadly – using the typology of elite interactions developed in the previous section. The 
typology presented in Table 1 anticipated the conditions under which wartime elites are likely 
to lend support to criminal justice initiatives based on evolving relationships of inter- and intra-
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group relationships of conflict and cooperation. Table 3 presents the frequently occurring 
patterns of elite interaction that emerged from the interviews and case histories within the 
framework of this typology. The mechanisms do not fit perfectly into each quadrant. Indeed, 
sometimes similar dynamics can give rise to multiple mechanisms, and sometimes the same 
mechanism can emerge from different types of relationships. Nevertheless, they serve to 
illustrate the importance of different cross-cutting dimensions of elite politics in determining 
local cooperation and support for specific rule of law projects.  
Table 3 about here 
Table 3: Within and across group relationships of conflict and cooperation motivating elite behaviour 
 
 Relationships of conflict Relationships of cooperation 
Intra-group • Removing challengers (support) • Protecting loyalties (obstruct) 
• Brokering deals (support or obstruct) 
Inter-group • Removing adversaries (support) • Deflecting attention (support) 
• Brokering deals (support or obstruct) 
 
1. Protecting loyalties 
The mechanism I term “protecting loyalties” refers to influential elites obstructing human 
rights prosecutions by intervening in proposed arrest warrants to protect the loyalties of groups 
or individuals within their units or broader patronage networks. In eastern DR Congo, this 
mechanism most often involved members of the FARDC, since the Congolese military retains 
exclusive jurisdiction over approving and executing military warrants.48 When FARDC elites 
wish to ensure that trusted groups or individuals remain by their side, they may intervene to 
prevent investigations against those individuals from moving forward. In the cases analyzed, 
powerful FARDC elites often had close personal relationships with those implicated in mass 
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violence, leading them to stand in the way of investigations, arrests and trials. Influential 
figures within the national army also assisted members of their patronage networks in escaping 
from prison or across the border to obstruct a legal case from proceeding. This mechanism 
pertained predominantly to intra-group relationships of cooperation.  
2. Brokering deals 
The mechanism I term brokering deals can involve both inter- or intra-group 
dynamics and may involve relationships of cooperation or of conflict. Deals may be brokered 
between apparent adversaries in the conflict in order to support cases moving forward through 
the legal system or obstruct them from going to trial. In positive cases, individuals in one unit 
may be handed over to elites by their superiors in exchange for some benefit or good from 
another group. Such deals may involve indictments against lower-ranking combatants with the 
promise that accusations against higher-ranking indictees be dropped. In negative cases, armed 
actors may persuade political and military elites within the government to obstruct or abandon 
all investigations against them in exchange for a payoff such as committing troops to assist in 
renewed combat or facilitating the pursuit of a particular political or economic objective. Deals 
may involve committing troops to an insurgency; offering to mobilize support for a particular 
policy position; or allowing access to resource-rich territory under the control of another group. 
While deals can give rise to dynamics of intra-group conflict when subordinates are handed 
over by their superiors as political, military or economic exchange, these types of scenarios are 
typically motivated by a desire on the part of elites to forge relationships of inter-group or 
intra-group cooperation. 
3. Removing challengers or adversaries  
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This mechanism affects both intra- and inter-group dynamics of conflict. Internally, it 
involves support for investigations in the form of turning allies or subordinates over to legal 
institutions as part of an internal effort to remove potential dissidents, trouble-makers or 
challengers to authority from within the ranks of the group, network or unit in question. This 
mechanism serves the purpose of advancing an elite’s personal survival and influence within a 
group by using legal institutions to remove potential threats to their power and authority. 
Externally, the mechanism involves support for accountability efforts in the form of removing 
adversaries from the battlefield. This usually takes the form of one party to the conflict – 
typically a FARDC network, sometimes in collaboration with another party – launching a 
military offensive against an adversary or a member of a rival faction in the name of executing 
an arrest warrant issued by a military prosecutor. Such cases perhaps resemble the most direct 
examples of utilizing new institutions as sites of continued or ongoing warfare. In such cases, 
one party to the conflict continues in its efforts to destroy the organizational autonomy of 
another through removing leadership figures from the battlefield to the courtroom.  
Deflecting attention from other activities  
This mechanism involves elites from one group offering support to investigations by 
scapegoating junior officers as part of outward-looking efforts to deflect attention away from 
crimes, abuses or other political and military activities being carried out in other spheres. 
Rather than constituting an explicit deal with another group, this mechanism serves as an 
implicit deal, whereby elites cooperate with accountability efforts to deflect attention away 
from abuse or misconduct they are implicated in elsewhere. Although it can also generate 
dynamics of intra-group conflict (since it usually involves elites turning over their lower-
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ranking colleagues to the international community or the FARDC), the mechanism is primarily 
born out of a desire to foster inter-group cooperation so that the pursuit of other economic, 
political or military agendas can proceed without interference.  
At least one of these four mechanisms was present in all but two of the cases analyzed. 
In those two, Kalundu and Katasomwa, the legal process appeared to proceed unimpeded by 
virtue of the individuals in custody lacking powerful allies or anything of value to bargain 
over. Both Kalundu and Katasomwa involved FDLR combatants who were isolated or poorly 
networked with other armed groups in the region. In the first, suspects surrendered themselves 
voluntarily after arrest warrants were issued, and in the second they were captured and 
transferred into military custody by UN forces removed from local conflict dynamics.  
Support for human rights prosecutions thus often serves a dual purpose for wartime elites. 
They can signal their cooperation with peacebuilding efforts in one sphere while pursuing 
conflict-related agendas in others. Post-conflict institutions therefore offer spaces where deals 
and negotiations can be brokered, and powerful, armed elites can dispose of adversaries or 
potential challengers in ways that reinforce their military power and advance their strategic 
interest. Where these dynamics are present, they may foster rather than diffuse a climate of 
insecurity and distrust.  
In what follows, I highlight my analysis from South Kivu. Other than one narrative 
history discussed in Part IV, I do not discuss the North Kivu cases here. This is because in 
November 2012, all records held by military prosecutors in North Kivu were destroyed during 
M23’s occupation of Goma. The destruction of court records, and the high turnover of military 
personnel during the occupation, meant that the depth of analysis possible in South Kivu could 
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not be replicated to the same level of detail in the North Kivu study. The narrative evidence 
from North Kivu in Part IV serves to illustrate that similar dynamics were present in both 
provinces.  
Table 4 therefore summarizes the dynamics at play for the 20 South Kivu cases. Grey 
shading is used to identify cases that eventually resulted in trial for at least one individual 
during the time-frame of study. Boxes that remain unshaded represent cases that never went to 
trial, either because they were obstructed or because they were delayed awaiting trial at the 
time of writing. Many cases, such as Minova, Mupoke and Djele Felixe, resulted in trials 
against some individuals while investigations into others were obstructed.  
Table 4 about here 
 
Table 4: Summary of mechanisms at work across 20 cases in South Kivu 
 
Grey-shading indicates cases that resulted in trial in the timeframe of study. 
An asterisk denotes that a trial occurred after the timeframe of study. 
 
Case ID Broker deals  Protect 
loyalties  
Deflect 
attention  
Remove 
challengers / 
adversaries  
Legal process 
appeared 
unobstructed 
Birungurungu   X    
Bunyakiri     X   
Cent-Six *    X  
Djela Felixe * X  X    
Fizi    X X  
Kalundu      X 
Katasomwa      X 
Kitindi X X    
Kizima *    X  
Lwizi  X X    
Matili     X  
Minova *  X X   
Mulenge   X X   
Mupoke   X    
Mutarole   X    
Nakiele  X X    
Nsabimana X     
Nyatura X     
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Nzovu     X  
Yakutumba X   X  
 
 
In addition to Kalundu and Katasomwa which proceeded without interference, only five 
cases resulted in trial during the time frame of study (shaded in grey). These five cases 
illustrate the importance of the mechanisms in driving cases to trial. In the case of Fizi, the 
legal process moved forward because the prosecution of Lt. Kibibi and his accomplices was 
used to justify increased militarism by the FARDC in other areas and as a way for the FARDC 
military elite of the time to remove a potential trouble-maker from their ranks. In two further 
cases, Bunyakiri and Matili, arrests were made as part of a FARDC effort to remove military 
adversaries from the battlefield. In the remaining two cases, Mulenge and Mupoke, the cases 
only reached trial following considerable interference and obstruction against certain indictees. 
In Mulenge, accomplices of the accused attempted to block the legal process by helping the 
defendants escape, although they were eventually recaptured and tried; and in Mupoke, 
FARDC officers assisted three of the four accused in escaping across the border to Rwanda, so 
that only one of the accused (the one who was not allied politically or militarily with any 
FARDC elites), ended up facing trial. 
Four of the remaining cases, Cent-Six, Djela Felixe, Kizima and Minova, resulted in 
trial after field research for this article was concluded. In two of these cases, Cent-Six and 
Kizima, FARDC adversaries were targeted by the national army and with the support of local 
communities in order to remove hostile elements from the battlefield. Trials were held as soon 
as sufficient funds had been procured. For Djela and Minova, the progression of the legal 
process was only possible due to the scapegoating of junior officers in deals made to protect 
their superiors. In both cases, lower-ranking individuals faced trial as a direct result of explicit 
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deals brokered to protect their superiors and other individuals implicated in the incidents in 
question.  
Nine cases that were not dismissed by military prosecutors on logistical grounds never 
made it to trial at all. In one of these, Nzovu, the legal process proceeded unobstructed, but the 
cases were simply stalled awaiting trial by the time the study was concluded. Of the remaining 
eight, five involved protecting loyalties. In three of those five (Kitindi, Lwizi and Nakiele), 
deals were also brokered explicitly to protect the accused from prosecution. In Birungurungu 
and Mutarule protecting loyalties was the only mechanism at work. In two of the remaining 
three cases for which investigations were continually obstructed, Nyatura and Yakutumba, 
deals were brokered protecting specific individuals from prosecution in exchange for 
committing troops from Mai Mai Nyatura and ex-PARECO, to assist the FARDC in its fight 
against M23. The case of Nsabimana was obstructed by Generals Makenga and Ntaganda 
when they exerted influence over the FARDC’s military command but, since Nsabimana 
defected with M23, he was no longer in the country at the time of writing. In many cases in 
which deals were brokered, the outcome of the deal was to serve the military objectives of 
powerful armed factions in anticipation of renewed outbreaks of violent conflict. 
The following section explores two cases in depth, one from North Kivu and one from 
South Kivu, to illustrate the complex ways in which these mechanisms reflect and construct the 
broader landscape of violent conflict in eastern DR Congo, as well as the ways in which post-
conflict institutions can reproduce and reinforce these dynamics in the post-conflict period.  
IV. War and Politics in North and South Kivu 
South Kivu: Brokering deals in the case of Nakiele  
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On the 10th June 2011, FARDC Colonel Kulimushi (Alias: Kifaru) and approximately 
150 of his troops entered the village of Abala in South Kivu. The soldiers were hungry and 
thirsty, and were looking for food, water or other valuables. As they entered the village, the 
soldiers began looting houses, stealing food, money and other possessions from villagers, and 
committing sexual attacks against local populations.49 As Col. Kifaru and his troops continued 
their journey through the eastern mountains of South Kivu’s high plateau similar attacks were 
reported in the nearby villages of Nakiele and Kanguli.50 
Col. Kifaru had deserted his military base south of Nakiele on June 8th to express his 
dissatisfaction with an army reshuffle under which he and many of his close allies were about 
to be denied influential positions within the national army.51 Col. Kifaru, previously the overall 
commander of several brigades, had learned that he was likely to be replaced by a colonel from 
a rival armed group, the predominantly pastoralist Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes. Colonel 
Kifaru was a former member of the PARECO group, elements of which were integrated into 
the national army in 2009 following peace agreements with the government. 
The attacks around Nakiele gained a great deal of media attention in the Kivu 
provinces.52 Government spokesperson Lambert Mende announced that his forces were 
actively looking for Colonel Kifaru and DR Congo's justice minister confirmed that he had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Radio Okapi 2013. 
50 Auditorat Militaire Superieure de Sud Kivu: RMP 1358/MTL/11. 
51 Quick 2015; Stearns 2011. 
52 See: BBC 2011a; Relief Web 2011; Radio Okapi 2011. 
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given orders for a special tribunal to initiate criminal proceedings against Col. Kifaru and his 
troops, accused of mass rape, looting and other crimes against humanity. 
Realizing that he would be unable to remain in hiding, Col. Kifaru surrendered to the 
national army in early July, with 191 men and a stockpile of heavy weapons.53 Lt. Col. 
Kazarama, the army spokesperson for operations in South Kivu at the time, announced that 
Col. Kifaru and his men would stay at an army base in Luberizi until South Kivu’s military 
prosecutor and MONUSCO completed joint investigations into the mass rape allegations. In 
addition to mass rape, Col. Kifaru and his troops were charged with stealing goats, chickens 
and other property, and setting up illegal toll stations around Fizi. 
  However, months later, little progress had been made in the investigations, despite the 
fact that Col. Kifaru had been detained in UN and FARDC custody. Later the same year, all 
charges against Col. Kifaru were abandoned indefinitely when he was made commander of 
South Kivu’s 111th regiment.  
  Reports differ as to the sequence of events that followed Col. Kifaru’s reemergence 
from hiding. Some indicated (verified by UN representatives and FARDC army spokesperson 
Vianney Kazarama) that as of July 7th, 2011, Col. Kifaru was detained in military custody by 
the 10th Military Region of the FARDC, and investigations against him were ongoing.54 
However, others informed me that Col. Kifaru had entered into negotiations with regional 
FARDC commanders, General Masunzu, and Sultani Makenga. As a result of these 
negotiations, Generals Masunzu and Makenga ultimately acknowledged that “mistakes had 
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been made” in the charges levied against Col. Kifaru. 
  Interviewees reported that General Makenga had brokered a deal with Col. Kifaru, 
giving him the opportunity to reintegrate into the national army without further investigation. 
This sequence of events can be better explained by a closer examination of the military 
command structure in South Kivu in mid-2011.  
At the time of the initial investigation, ex-CNDP commanders Bosco Ntaganda and 
Sultani Makenga commanded immense power and influence in South Kivu’s military 
hierarchy. Thus, any military or political decision at the time had to go through them.55 In the 
same time period, Col. Kifaru maintained considerable influence over a number of ex-
PARECO troops who were formerly integrated into the national army. Interviewees noted that 
Col. Kifaru refused to mobilize support for ex-PARECO reintegration into the FARDC’s 105th 
and 111th regiment until the charges against him were dropped. However, this was not the end 
of the story. While Lieutenant Kibibi and the officers implicated in the case of Fizi some 
months prior were considered to be “small fish” and thus dispensable to Col. Makenga, Col. 
Kifaru was incredibly valuable to a variety of local elites given the influence he held over his 
ex-PARECO troops.  
  In mid-2011, Gen. Sultani Makenga and Bosco Ntaganda were engaged in efforts to 
build broad-based support within the rank and file of the FARDC, and beyond. Soon after, they 
would spearhead the defection of the M23 movement in 2012. Generals Makenga and 
Ntaganda thus strongly welcomed the opportunity to broker a deal in the form of a military 
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alliance with Col. Kifaru and the ex-PARECO troops loyal to him. As a result of Makenga and 
Ntaganda’s enormous influence over the activities of the 10th Military Region, Gen. Masunzu 
was willing to agree that local Bembe populations had likely manufactured reports of mass 
rapes for political reasons and thus there was no further need to pursue investigations into the 
alleged attacks in Nakiele.56 
 On 4th April, 2012, Sultani Makenga and Bosco Ntaganda led a mass defection from the 
Congolese army, under the name of the Mouvement de 23-mars (M23), taking with them 
approximately 300 ex-CNDP soldiers.57 In the weeks and months that followed, increasing 
numbers of ex-CNDP troops, as well as units from other previously integrated armed groups 
joined the M23 movement. Interviewees commented that Col. Kifaru had brokered a deal with 
Generals Makenga and Ntaganda, that he would defect with the M23 movement on the 
condition of stalling or obstructing his prosecution and arrest. As a result, Col. Kifaru had been 
present at a number of M23’s late planning meetings, immediately prior to the defection. 
  For reasons unknown, Col. Kifaru did not defect with the M23 movement. Instead, he 
remained with the FARDC and immediately re-entered into negotiations with Gen. Masunzu. 
Given that he was now privy to important national security information (in the form of M23’s 
defection plans and military strategy), Col. Kifaru now served as a critical resource to the 
FARDC’s counter-intelligence strategy against the newly formed insurgency. Col. Kifaru was 
thus able to enter into a new round of negotiations with Gen. Masunzu in which he would 
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continue to provide information and support to FARDC’s military intelligence in exchange for 
remaining sealed from prosecution. Between 2011 and the disarmament of the M23 movement 
in late 2012, international organizations made efforts to pressure the military justice system to 
resume investigations into Col. Kifaru. These efforts were largely unsuccessful, although 
pressure has mounted since the threat posed by the M23 insurgency has subsided.58  
North Kivu: Brokering deals and removing challengers in Walikale 
In July and August 2010, several armed groups were implicated in mass rapes and 
lootings that took place in thirteen villages in Walikale territory, North Kivu. A UN 
investigation documented 387 rapes, the looting of 965 shops and houses, and the abduction of 
116 civilians.59 The attacks were carried out over a five day period by a coalition of combatants 
from the Mai Mai Sheka militia, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), 
and troops loyal to Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Nsengiyumva, a former CNDP officer 
integrated into the national army who defected after the arrest of Laurent Nkunda. The UN 
investigation found that the attack was ordered by Captain Sérafin Lionso of the FDLR, 
Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Nsengiyumva, and Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, the commander of 
Mai Mai Sheka, at a meeting in the village of Wango, at the time a stronghold of the Mai Mai 
Sheka group. The operation was intended to weaken Congolese army positions and punish 
local populations accused of collaborating with government forces. 
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In response to the attacks on the Walikale axis, on 30th August 2010 the Congolese 
judicial authorities opened an investigation into Captain Sérafin Lionso, Lieutenant Colonel 
Emmanuel Nsengiyumva, Commander Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, Lieutenant Colonel Sadoke 
Mayele and four others implicated in crimes against humanity in the attacks, including the 
crimes against humanity of rape, looting and abduction of civilians. North Kivu’s military 
prosecutor, with support from the UN Stabilization Mission to DR Congo (MONUSCO) and 
the UN Development Program visited Walikale territory to interview over 150 victims and 
witnesses to the attack.60 Moreover, attorneys and psychologists associated with an ABA legal 
aid clinic in North Kivu took testimony and provided assistance to 147 survivors in the affected 
areas, and filed 108 related cases with the Military Prosecutor’s Office.61 
Following these investigations, on January 6th, 2011, provisional arrest warrants were 
issued against Commander Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, Lieutenant Colonel Mayele, Captain Lionso, 
and four Congolese army deserters.62 Lieutenant Colonel Nsengiyumva died before the warrant 
was issued. Lieutenant Colonel Mayele was taken into custody, and was tried in December the 
following year.63  
To the casual observer, the trial of Sadoke Mayele was hailed a major milestone for 
human rights and the rule of law in North Kivu. A high-ranking rebel combatant, commanding 
a unit implicated in a series of grave human rights atrocities, was arrested and brought to 
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justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity carried out against civilian populations. 
Indeed, while it was not feasible to expect every individual implicated in the attacks to be 
identified and brought to trial, the arrest of a high ranking officer responsible for leading his 
foot soldiers into battle just a few months after the incident occurred was touted as a major 
victory for those working towards building a culture of legal accountability for violent crime.  
Yet, on closer inspection, the trial of Colonel Mayele was the result of a complex 
process of negotiation among the various groups competing for authority and access in 
Walikale. Rather than representing a valiant effort to promote the rule of law, therefore, the 
arrest and trial formed part of an effort to remove challengers who had fallen out of favour with 
their superiors and to broker political and economic deals among different sets of armed actors. 
Attention to the micro-politics of armed groups in Walikale is needed to clarify the ways in 
which the broader landscape of conflict shaped the dynamics of Mayele’s trial.  
Due to limited state authority in Walikale territory, several armed groups, including 
Mai Mai Sheka, FDLR, and troops loyal to Lieutenant Colonel Nsengiyumva, established 
bases in the forests of Walikale.64 Although mining concessions have been granted to 
companies operating in the region, economic enterprises are largely controlled by armed 
groups who have also assumed authority over various other governance activities. A number of 
these groups, including the three implicated in the 2010 attacks, joined forces in early 2010 
with the aim of demonstrating their combined power to secure concessions from private 
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businesses and the Congolese armed forces.65 Civilians are regularly required to negotiate 
protection from these groups in exchange for a monthly “security tax”.66 
Sadoke Mayele had vocally opposed Commander Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka’s close 
collaboration with the FDLR, and had fallen somewhat out of favour with his superiors as a 
result. Just prior to the 2010 attacks, Mayele had been detained and allegedly tortured under 
orders from Commander Sheka. Mayele professed that Commander Sheka had deliberately 
turned him over to the military courts in order to punish him for his dissent and lack of loyalty. 
In this sense, Sheka used the veneer of impartial criminal justice as a smokescreen to 
discipline, punish and ultimately remove a potential challenger from his ranks.  
In addition, credible sources confirmed that Commander Sheka himself handed over 
Sadoke Mayele to UN and Congolese army officials as part of a political deal to allow 
Commander Sheka to continue his activities in Walikale unobstructed. Indeed, despite a 
warrant for his arrest, Commander Sheka registered as a candidate in the 2011 national 
assembly elections to represent the mineral-rich territory of Walikale.67 As a result, he has 
made numerous public appearances in Goma from 2010 onwards. His frequent public 
appearances, as well as meetings with FARDC officials, evidence that no serious efforts have 
been made to execute the warrant of arrest against him; instead, it is clear that he has been 
explicitly protected.68 Moreover, although the arrest warrant against him was never formally 
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lifted, the trial for events in Walikale territory continued without further mention of Sheka 
himself. As a result, attacks by members of Mai Mai Sheka against civilian populations have 
continued. Further, Mai Mai Sheka’s military operations along the Walikale axis have 
expanded, often under direct instructions from Commander Sheka himself and, at times, with 
implicit permission from Congolese military and political elites who benefit financially from 
collaborating with Sheka’s business operations.69  
V. Conclusion 
The Nakiele and Walikale cases persuasively demonstrate the ways in which wartime 
elites have used legal institutions to consolidate power and shore up for the continuation or 
return to violence and extortion. The strategic manipulation of the justice system to surrender 
dissidents in exchange for access to illicit mining concessions, and to rally troops for 
insurgency, is emblematic of the ways in which elites pursue conflict-related agendas through 
institutional as well as military channels. These complex webs of interaction comprise the on- 
and off-battlefield dimensions of protracted civil conflict.  
DR Congo is certainly not the only site where post-conflict institutions have 
complicated transitions to peace. Radin (2012) demonstrates that elites in East Timor utilized 
the creation of a supposedly impartial police force by the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to cement formal and informal wartime networks in 
ways that proved invisible to international stakeholders. Wartime elites often outwardly 
accepted demands placed on them by UNTAET while using private obstruction to maximize 
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positions of political advantage and block more inclusive political reforms.70 More recently, 
military elites in South Sudan have built post-conflict networks that reward loyal combatants, 
and have used nascent political institutions to build patronage-based political fiefdoms. This 
has ensured the rapid and easy mobilization to violence whenever political bargaining breaks 
down.71 The strategic manipulation of post-conflict institutions is not limited to these cases or 
to the rule of law. Cross-nationally, Flores and Nooruddin show that electoral institutions in 
fragile or unstable political environments can exacerbate insecurity by allowing conflict-era 
elites new venues to reward allies and punish wartime adversaries. This has raised the spectre 
of resurgent violence in nascent post-conflict democracies by fostering mistrust among factions 
and incentivizing a return to arms.72  
Post-conflict institutions are perhaps most vulnerable to damaging backstage 
manipulation following conflicts where no single party has secured a decisive victory. This is 
because, where the organizational autonomy of respective factions remains intact after the 
conflict’s apparent conclusion, the threat of resurgent violence looms largest over political 
reforms.73 When uncertainty introduces incentives for wartime elites to maintain positions of 
strategic advantage in case of a return to war, they are led to advance political and military 
goals in multiple arenas simultaneously.74 The temporary transfer of military grievances to 
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74 See Carson (2015) for a powerful illustration of the ways in which “backstage” strategies are 
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non-military realms creates a vicious cycle of violence, compounding commitment problems 
by further eroding trust and thereby undermining the very purpose for which new institutions 
were created. Yet, it is precisely in these most volatile of settings that the international 
community has deemed institution-building most necessary.75 Looking forward, international 
stakeholders should be wary of supporting institution-building projects that play directly into 
the conflict-related agendas of powerful warring elites. 
One important outstanding question concerns whether or not the intermittent (but 
potentially increasing) relocation of conflicts over land, power and resources from the 
battlefield to institutional realms will lead to an incremental shift away from military violence 
over time. Kathryn Sikkink’s work offers an important interjection on this point. Sikkink 
suggests that the prosecution of perpetrators of conflict-related violence in courts of law will 
have positive effects for human rights and rule of law outcomes overall, regardless of the 
specifics of case selection or anything else that transpires behind the scenes.76 Yet Sikkink also 
observes that when legal processes are manipulated or unfairly used to punish losers, the 
potential for longterm positive outcomes is diminished. When post-conflict institutions are 
used, as they are in the Congolese case, as platforms to consolidate parallel authority structures 
and prepare for renewed violence, or when cooperation is used in a tacit bid to deflect attention 
away from continued military incursions, the ability for those institutions to contribute to a 
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reduction in violence certainly appears to be compromised. Further research, drawing from 
additional cases, is needed in order to understand whether backstage or pre-trial manipulation 
of the type documented here is likely to threaten the long-term positive externalities that derive 
from independent and impartial legal processes elsewhere.77  
The Congolese case thus heeds a number of powerful lessons for scholars of post-
conflict peace. Advancing our knowledge of complex multi-party conflicts, it demonstrates that 
conflict and cooperation can co-exist within and among armed groups, and transgress military, 
political and economic realms. These conflictual and collaborative interactions construct the 
broader landscape of wartime political orders, and do not dissipate simply because formal 
hostilities cease. Moreover, the quest for personal as well as organizational power helps 
explain why elites are likely to lend their support to certain peacebuilding efforts but not 
others. These dynamics have important consequences for the ways in which elites navigate 
decisions to commit to peace. Finally, when elites use institutional channels to maximize 
positions of military, political and economic advantage within their group and externally – so 
that they are well-placed to advance conflict-era goals in a variety of possible future scenarios 
– post-conflict institutions can exacerbate the security dilemma and heighten conditions of 
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of “comparison to the ideal,” which, they argue, proves unfair in post-conflict settings. Rather than assessing 
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in DR Congo would unlikely be brighter absent any investment in the rule of law. Indeed, it is clear that some 
aspects of legal capacity-building – such as an increased public awareness of human rights violations and the 
training of lawyers and judges in international criminal law – will contribute positively to an improved human 
rights climate over time. Nevertheless, in order to avoid perpetuating conditions of mistrust that exacerbates 
cyclical violence, donors and human rights practitioners must be diligent in calling out political manipulation 
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mistrust over time. Without sufficient attention to these dynamics, scholars and policy-makers 
remain ill-equipped to understand the fluid character of many contemporary civil conflicts, and 
the role institutional reform is able to play in its prevention.  
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